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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DANIEL E. MURRAY*
INTRODUCTION

The reader is warned that in this section of this article, the author
is enunciating his own controversial views, which may not receive the
approbation of a majority of the bench and bar. Those readers, perhaps
few in number, who agree with the author about the happy demise of
certain Legislative Bills, are warned that they may be resurrected in future
Legislative Sessions and,
. . , like an unruly dog, which, if not securely chained to its own
kennel, is prone to wander into places where it ought not to
be ... 1

It is submitted that with the exception of the defeat of measures 2
designed to outlaw common law marriages after January 1, 1956, and a
measure 3 allowing the defendant, in a bastardy proceeding, to require
that the plaintiff and the child submit to a serological examination to
negate the alleged paternity of the defendant, the Legislature is more to
be commended for bills which it defeated rather than for the ones which
it passed.
Those defeated measures which would have required a six months
residence, 4 nine months residence, 5 or a years residence for a divorce,
if enacted, might not have had the hoped for effect of seriously decreasing the number of divorces granted to "migratory residents" based upon
perjured testimony of residence. In the final analysis, if a divorce seeker
is willing to commit perjury about a ninety day residence, he will probably
not hesitate to commit perjury about a six months or one year's residence. The real effect of any change in the residence requirement would
be to discourage persons from ever coming to Florida for a divorce. If
there is a "divorce mill" problem, then the remedy lies in the Bar Association's cleaning its own ranks rather than in placing the burden upon
the Legislature.
The Legislature wisely defeated two measures, one of which would
have repealed impotency, extreme cruelty, ungovernable temper and
habitual intemperance as grounds for divorce,7 and another which would
have prohibited final decrees of divorce until an interloctutory decree had
*Lecturer, University of Miami School of Law.
I. Kregliner v. New Pategonia Meat & Cold Storage Co., (1914) A. C. 25 at 46.
2. S. 193 and H.R. 500, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
3. H.R. 568, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
4. S.22, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
5. H.R. 803, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
6. S. 54 and H.R. 165, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
7. H.R. 802, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
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been in effect for at least six months. 8 The enactment of the first measure
would have left adultery and desertion as the most important grounds for
divorce. It seems to the author that any lawyer or judge, with even a
cursory knowledge of the seamy divorce situation in New York, would
realize that it is better public policy to allow divorces for actual reasons
than to force the parties in effect, to manufacture a case of adultery.
It is submitted that the so-called divorce problem is essentially a
sociological, psychological, theological and economic one rather than a
legal problem. Once the parties have decided upon a divorce, there is
very little that the law can do to preserve the marriage either by limiting
the grounds or by delaying the entry of a final decree.
Another defeated measure 9 designed to supersede the Slatcoff and
Frank'0 cases, would have allowed Chancellors to appoint special masters
over the objection of the parties. Obviously, this bill, if enacted, would
have been a boon to those judges, few in number, who are either too lazy
to carry out their official duties, or who grant certain lawyers compensation (at the litigant's expense) for past and future political support.
This section does not purport to cover all legislation introduced at
the last session, but only those bills which the author feels to be of general
interest. A full report would unduly extend this already lengthy article.
COMMON LAW MARRIAGES

A woman who has a husband living cannot, of course, be the common
law wife of another man. In addition, where she has been living in adultery
with an alleged common law husband, then neither of the parties are fit
persons to be awarded custody of a child. Further, when she does not
contribute to the purchase price of real property, she is not entitled to
any portion thereof."
Where the record shows that there was no impediment to the marriage, the general repute and intention of the parties was established to
the satisfaction of the County Judge, and when the wife testified, inter alia,
that the alleged husband had visited her for a considcrable time "until
I and him agreed to live together as man and wife," then a common law
marriage had been established. The court reiterated the "Laynbrose"
rule, 12 that the burden of proof upon the alleged common law wife is only
to establish a prima facie case, and then the burden of proof shifts to the
person asserting that there is no common law marriage.'8

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

H.R. 805, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).

S. 339 and HR. 729, 35th Regular Session, Florida (1955).
See footnote 101, infra.
Porter v. LaFe, 68 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1953).
Lambrose v. Topham, 55 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1951).
In re Colson's Estate, 72 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1954).
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Where a wife was divorced from her husband, and was receiving $30.00
a week as alimony from him, but continued co-habiting with him subsequent to the divorce decree, the court held that she had not even proved
a prima facie case of present assent or a marriage by repute and habitation, because the facts showed that the alleged husband (now deceased)
had introduced her as his former wife and that she had expressed elation
about their divorce. The court stated that the alleged wife was not required
to prove that she was the common law wife by a preponderance of the
evidence, but the evidence in this case was so weak as to show that there
had never been any present assent by the parties.' 4
Where a master found that the parties had lived together as 'ian
and wife for a period of five years, but finally determiincd that there was
no evidence of a contract of a marriage between the parties, basing his
ruling upon the theory that this alleged marriage was merely an arrangement for "convenience and business reasons" the Supreme Court reversed
his findings that no contract had been established, saying that,
If marriage for convenience and business reasons is sufficient to
to hold the agreement illegal, it might be hard to sustain the
legality of countless thousands of marriages . . . . It matters not
whether the arrangement or the contract or the marriage was for
a 'mere convenience' or 'business reason' if the marriage was once
established, it remains established until dissolved by death or
divorce.
The Supreme Court reiterated its view in the Fineher 5 case, that the
lower court should sever the issues and first determine whether or not a
prima facie common law marriage exists before entering into hearings with
reference to alimony and attorney's fees. 1 6

In one case' 7 the facts seemed to show that the alleged husband and
wife started to co-habit as man and wife on June 2, 1949, and that in
August, 1952, a divorce suit was filed between them. Pending the hearing of this divorce suit the parties rcconcilcd, but, nevertheless, a divorce
decree was entered without the parties ever bothering to have the decree
set aside. The wife talked to a doctor after the alleged husband had been
injured and told him that they had becn living together, but were divorced,
and that they planned to get rc-married in the future. It was held that
there was not sufficient evidence that a common law marriage had been
consummated after the divorce decree,

14. In te Klinger's Estate, 73 So,2d 56 (Fia. 1954), compare with Navarro, Inc.
v. Baker, 54 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1951).
15. Fincher v. Fincher, 55 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1952).
16. Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1954). The reader is referred
to this case for examples of corroboration of the alleged common law wife's testimony
and the proving of cohabitation by habit and repute.
17. Persico v. Samac Corporation, 74 So.2d (Fla. 1954), compare with Navarro,
Inc. v. Baker, 54 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1951).
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ANNULMENT

Although a wife was committed to the State Hospital at Chatahoochee
after the parties had married for a second time the Supreme Court affirmed a finding that the wife was sane at the time of the marriage ceremony, which finding was based on the fact that the minister had questioned
the parties as to the sanctity of the marriage vow, and the court later did
likewise along with counsel for both parties. The court also ruled that
the transcript of testimony of a doctor, made at a prior divorce hearing
between the parties, was not admissible in the instant annulment suit
absent a showing that he was unavailable to testify in person. Filially,
the court approved the entry of a separate maintenance decree unconnected with divorce and the award of counsel fees and court costs against
the husband:
Alimony, suit money, and attorneys fees, always accrue against
the husband in a case like this, absent a showing of adultery on
the part of the wife in which alimony may not be enforced.
Masilotti v. Masilotti, 150 Fla.86, 7 So.2d 132; Chesnut v. Chesnut, 160 Fla. 83, 33 So.2d 730.18
Where a husband alleged that his wife was a victim of tuberculosis
at the time of their marriage and that she had concealed it from him for
the purpose of inducing him to marry her, the Supreme Court refused to
decide whether or not the concealment of a disease, such as tuberculosis,
is a sufficient ground for annulment in the state of Florida.19 It is submitted that the better view is that fraudulent concealment of a disease
dangerous to the other spouse is a ground for annulment.2 0
JURISDICIION, DOMICILE AND VENUE

The court adhered to its views in the Copeland case 2' in upholding
a defendant's motion to dismiss predicated upon his plea of privilege to be

sued in the County of his residence as provided 22 for in the Florida
Statutes.

23

The parties had lived together as man and wife in Florida for several
years, and when the wife separated from him she continued to live in
Florida. The Supreme Court held,
It is true we have repeatedly held that a wife may not establish
a residence (for the purpose of instituting a divorce action) separate from that of her husband so long as she continues to live
with him, but that she may do so if she separates from him for
just cause . , . The reason for such ruling is that the law recognizes
18. Abbe v. Abbe, 68 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1953).

19. Tsapelas v. Tsapelas, 69 So.Zd 315 (Fla. 1954).
20. Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 50 N.E. 933 (1898)
Davis v. Davis, 90 N.J.Eq. 158, 106 Atl. 644 (1919).
21. Copeland v, Copeland, 53 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1951).
22. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1953).
23. Thames v. Thames, 75 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1954).

(veneral diseases).
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the husband as the head of the family and the residence established by him is the residence of the wife unless through his fault
she is compelled to leave the family domicile and establish her
own. But if as in this case the former residence of the family as
a unit was in Florida and the wife for just cause separated from
her spouse and set up her residence in this state with the intent
independently to become and remain a resident thereof, she may
"tack on" to such newly established independent residence the
period of time within which she was a resident of Florida by
virtue of the establishment of the family domicile in Florida by
the husband. 24
It Grammer v. Grammer a husband left his first wife in 1931, and she
never saw or corresponded with him after 1932. In 1951, the husband
obtained a Florida divorce based upon constructive service, and he then
remarried. After the husband's death his first wife brought suit to have the
divorce decree set aside, alleging that the husband had fraudulently omitted
the fact in his bill that she lived at 5345 Harding Avenue, Detroit, Michigan,
but had merely stated that she lived at "Harding Avenue, Detroit, Michigan." Held: the husband and his attorney had acted in good faith and
had done more than enough to establish compliance with the minimum requirements of the law relating to diligent search and inquiry. As
regards the required standard of diligence the court said,
The test, however, is not whether it was in fact possible to effect
personal service in a given case, but whether the complainant
reasonably employed knowledge at his command, made diligent
inquiry, and exerted an honest and conscientious effort appropriate
to the circumstances, to acquire the information necessary to enable
him to effect personal service on the defendant , . . Extraordinary
steps to ascertain the whereabouts of the party are not required ....
Reasonable diligence in such matters is an honest effort, and one
appropriate to the circumstances, to ascertain whether actual notice
may be given, and, if so, to give it. Such effort, however, need not
embrace a search in remote parts of the state (Jacob v. Roberts, 223
U.S. 261, 32 S. Ct. 303, 56 L. Ed. 429); and it is not esscntial that
all possible or conceivable means should be used. But the effort
should usually extend 2-to inquiry of persons likely or presumed to
know the facts sought.
.

ESTOPPEL AND

REOPENING

OF DECREES

Where a husband sued for divorce in Florida while a divorcc suit
by his wife was pending in Wisconsin, and during the pcndcncy of the
Florida suit the Wisconsin court entered a decree of divorce and a certified copy was mailed to the Florida court. Held: No attack being made

24. Frank v. Frank, 75 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
25. Grainmer v. Grammer, 80 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1955).

Although this case in-

volved the attempted re-opening of a divorce decree, the subject matter of the next
section, the author believes, rightly or wrongly, that the jurisdictional issue was the paramount one involved.
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upon the jurisdiction of the \Visconsin court, its decree was entitled to
full faith and credit in Florida,
. . and the judgment or decree first rendered dissolving the
marriage relation concludes the question .. .2"
A sailor obtained a divorce after service by publication and one year
and three months later the divorced wife filed a "motion" to quash
the final decree upon the ground that it had been obtained by a fraudulent misstatement of the wife's address. A copy of the motion was mailed
to the husband's fleet post office address, but he failed to appear. The
27
court held the attempt to re-open the ease by "motion" was improper
and since there was no valid service of process and the husband had
not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, the motion could not
be treated in the nature of an independent bill; therefore the lower court
was wholly without jurisdiction to set aside the final decree. The court
felt this decision made it unnecessary to consider the Soldier 8 and
Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940.21
A husband and wife entered into a property settlement. The husband
filed suit for divorce and the wife answered that the agreement was obtained by fraud. At the trial the wife received an additional $4,000.00
and she, through her attorney, waived rights of cross-examination and
did not offer any testimony relative to the alleged fraud of the husband.
Over a year after the divorce decree the wife filed a bill in the nature of a
bill of review alleging substantially the same charges of fraud that she
had earlier alleged. It was held in the divorce proceedings the husband
and wife were dealing at arms length, she was represented by counsel, no
confidental relationship exists between husband and wife in such a
proceeding, and she had no right to rely upon him to disclose anything
to her with reference to his property, and "litigation should end
30
sometime."
A former wife filed a suit asking for accounting and other relief
from her former husband, claiming that there had not been a full and
fair disclosure in the divorce suit (wherein a stipulation regarding a property settlement was embodied in the decree), and the chancellor who
heard the divorce suit also decided the instant suit on the testimony in
the instant case and on the file of the first case. It was held that since
26. Overly v. Overly. 66 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1953).
27. Citing Lorenz v. Lorenz, 152 Fla. 799, 13 So.2d 806 (1943), and Lorenz v.
lorenz, 149 Fla. 625, 6 So.2d 620 (1942).
28. 54 SrAT. 1178 (1940), 50 U.S.C. Appendix, § 501-590 (1952):
Stay of proceedings where military service affects conduct thereof. At any
stage thereof any action or proceeding in any Court in which a person in
military service is involved . . . shall, on application to it by such person
...be stayed . . . unless, in the opinion ot the court, the ability of (the
serviceman) to . . . conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason
of his military service. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
29. Edwards v. Edwards, 67 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1953).
30. Fuller v. Fuller, 68 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1953).
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the file of the
was impossible
The court also
where the facts

first case was not incorporatcd in the appellate record, it
for the Supreme Court to review the lower court orders.
held the defense of res adjudicata may be raised by motion
supporting such motion appear from the bill of complaint. 3 '

In Miani Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, a husband and wife entered
into a property settlement, approved in a final decree of divorce. Prior
to the divorce, the couple had established a very successful sanitorium
for alcoholics. After the divorce, the Attorney General filed a quo warranto
proceeding to annul the charter of the sanitorium on the grounds that
it was not a charitable institution; the wife was joined as a party and she
filed a cross-bill naming her husband and the corporation as defendants.
She collaterally attacked the property settlement made in the divorce
suit. The defenses of estoppel and res adjudicata were interposed and
adjudicated by the lower court and affirmed by the Supreme Court.:'-' Subsequently, the wife filed an ex parte application to file on original bill in
the nature of a bill of review directly attacking the property settlement.
The chancellor granted the request. The defendants filed a petition for
certiorari and the court held that in the first appearance of the case, the
court did not have the divorce suit before it; only the property settlement was before the court and was adjudicated in the prior case. The
court said, "we think it was set at rest in the quo warranto proceeding
and that the respondent is estopped by judgment to again raise the
33
question."
A husband secured a divorce based upon constructive service. Approximately one year after the wife filed a charge with the state contending that her husband had committed perjury in the affidavit for constructive service. The criminal charge was dismissed and the wife filed
a complaint to set aside the divorce decree on the same ground. The
judge who had tried the perjury action was the judge that heard the
instant action and, based upon his recollection of the perjury case, he
dismissed the wife's complaint. The Supreme Court reversed and said
that a judge should not be permitted nor allowed to "browse" among his
own records with a view to relieving litigants of trouble and expense,
that the records in the perjury action should have been introduced into
the instant action. The court said that there was not sufficient proof of
laches when the wife waited two years to file the bill of review, absent a
showing in the record that the defendant would be injured by the
late filing of the bill. 34
In Cadieux v. Cadieux a former wife filed a bill in the nature of a bill
of review to set aside a final divorce decree on the grounds that it was
31.
32.
33.
34.

Cohen v. Cohen, 70 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1954).
Miami Retreat Foundation v. Ervin, 62 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1953).
Reed v. Reed, 70 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1954).
Kelley v. Kelley, 75 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1954).
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obtained by fraud in that the husband had lied about her place of residence. At the time of the divorce decree, and presently, the husband was
a sailor in the Navy. He retained counsel in Florida who filed unsworn
motions to stav the proceedings in the present action under the Soldiers
and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940.Y' The motion failed to show the
defendant's defense was materially affected by reason of hiis military service,
therefore the Suprcmc Court held that the lower court was correct in
proceeding with the case.30
In 1952, a wife sued her husband for divorce and obtained a final
decrce. In April, 1953, the husband filed a bill in the nature of a bill of
review seeking to set aside the divorce onl the grounds that the wife's
affidavit for publication was false. The wife was personally served in the
action for review and filed no appearance; the husband then filed an
amended bill containing only two minor changes. The wife did not answer
the amended bill, and a decree pro confesso was entered; however, before
final judgment, the wife moved to vacate this decree, and for permission
to file an answer to the amended bill. The Chancellor denied the motion,
entered final judgment and the Supreme Court affirmed, stating,
The wife was properly served with the original bill in the nature
of a bill of review, was acquaitnted with its contents and purposes,
and chose to ignore it. The filing of an amended bill, which
was not served on the wvife and of whose existence she did not
even know, did not in any way prejudice the wife or mislead her
to her injury. She was in default on the original bill and tie
husband had the right to take judgment in accordance with the
allegations and prayers of the original bill.3 7
The husband and wife were married in 1918 in Rhode Island and
lived together there until 1937, at which time the wife secured a divorce
from bed and board in Rhode Island and the husband went to Nevada
and secured a divorce in 1938; sixteen years later the wife attacked the
validity of the Nevada decree in the Florida Courts, and the court held:
(1) The Florida Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter of this cause
because the wife was praying for an equitable decree to enforce the Rhode
Island decree for alimony and support. (2) As dicta, that just because the
man goes to Nevada for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce does not
mean that lie did not thereafter become a bona fide resident of Nevada.
(3) The wife's complaint that she was never personally served in Rhode
Island was not enough because perhaps Nevada does not require personal
service on the defendant. (4) If the decree is valid in Nevada it has to
be upheld by Florida. The court mentioned being required to take judicial
notice of the common law and stitutes of every state but stated:
We do not think that such evidence, in the form of judicial
notice, will supply the want of pleading in the Plaintiff's Bill.
35. STAr. 1178 (1940) 50 U.S.C. Appendix, § 521 (1952).
36. Cadicux v. Cadieux, 75 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1954).

37. Davidson v. Davidson, 76 So.2d 303 (FIa. 1954).
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(5) The court stressed that the fact that the wife waited 16 years while
the defendant had gone through two marriages, the Court stating,
. . . while the conduct of the defendant in fraudulently obtaining
a Nevada divorce, if lie did, is certainly reprehensible, the conduct
of the plaintiff in standing idly by for a long period of time and
permitting innocent persons to be deceived and misled in reliance
on an apparently valid decree, has something of the same quality;
it is, at least, sufficient to bar her suit under the doctrine of laches,
in the absence of some convincing explanation which will excuse
her failure to prosecute her action to invalidate the decree until
this late date. If such explanation is not forthcoming, we do not
see how the Court could conscientiously, under the facts showed
by the record now before this Court, invalidate the Nevada Divorce
Decree.-8
GROUNDS AND PROOF FOR DIVORCE

The facts showed that the wife accused her husband of falsifying
his income tax return by making false charitable deductions, falsely
accused him of immoral conduct, called him a crook, skunk and a liar, in
the presence of his friends, insulted his friends and children by a former
marriage, and accused him of being selfish and stingy, and:
that she to indulge these and other samples of her spleen the
days were found to be too short, so she would frequently rise
up in the night time and harass and annoy the Plaintiff with
them . . . and the only refuge left him was in the wisdom of
Solomon which he adopted and has found it much better to
dwell in the corner of the housetop than with a brawling woman
in a wide house.3 9
The court held there was sufficient proof of a charge of cruelty and frequent
indulgence in a violent and ungovernable temper.
In another case where a husband had co-habited with his wife
during the year she allegedly deserted him, the court held that,
... the continuity of obstinate desertion is broken, and the conduct
of a deserting spouse is condoned if the parties co-habit during the
period the statute prescribes. 0
In a case making its second appearance in the Supreme Court,4' the
court seemed to approve the view that the defense of recrimination for
wrongs done subsequent to the separation is not oii the same level as that
for wrongs done prior to separation, citing the Stewart case 42 for the
proposition that the application of the doctrine of recrimination is a
matter of sound judicial discretion dependent upon public policy, public
38,
39.
40.
41,

Lanigan v. Lanigan, 78 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1955).
Longino v. Longino. 67 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1953),
Bittnerv. Bittner, 67 So.2d 327 (Fla, 1953).
See previous report of this case in 62 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1952) discussed in 8
MIAMi LQ. 384 (1954).
42. tewart v. Stewart, 158 Fla. 326, 29 So.2d 247 (1947).
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welfare and the exigencies of the case at bar.13 It is submitted that
these arc very vague and nebulous standards.
The husband's decree was bascd upon extrcme cruelty and the wife
in her appeal contended that desertion and refusal to co-habit does not
coustitute extreme cruelty. The court did not answer the appellant's
assertion in so many words, but stated:
It appears that refusal of plaintiff to make defendant the beneficiary of a Life Insurance Policy was the bone of contention. This
with too much claugihter-in-]aw, cross-firing about the defcndant's
lack of culinary skill and numerous pccadillos on the part of both,
generated a low state of mental and enotional health that reduced
the marital union to a sort of hawk and buzzard existence which
subjected it to every destructive emotion . . .
The court concluded that this course of conduct caused mental and
physical suffering to the plaintiff and rendered further cohabitation of the
44
parties impossible.
An interlocutory divorce decree secured in California was not such a
-decree as satisfied the requirements of the Florida law45 authorizing a
divorce in favor of the complainant where the defendant has secured a
divorce from complainant in another state or country, because the California
decree, being interlocutory and subject to modification, did not have the
effect of automatically destroying the marital res at the end of the California
required one year waiting period.
. I It is held in this jurisdiction that the decree of a foreign
state that is subject to modification may not be accorded full faith
46
and credit under Section 1, Article IV Federal Constitution.
In Epstein v. Epstein the wife testified that during the year of their
married life her husband ran around with other women in her presence
and when she protested he said it was none of her business; also that he
nagged and used abusive language toward her and drank, and that she
stayed with him for the sake of her children but when the defendant
stayed away all night and was very abusive toward her she left him for
good. The court held that the evidence was ample to sustain a charge
of extreme cruelty and that the fact that the wife had waited 12 years
before seeking a legal dissolution of the marriage bonds did not bar her
suit. "Her grievances against him are just as nach an impediment to
marital felicity now as they were twelve years ago."' 7
A husband filed suit for divorce based upon the grounds of habitual
intemperance, extreme cruelty and desertion and the wife defended by
43.
44.
Fla. 260,
45.
46.
47.

Busch v. Busch, 68 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1953).
Rue v. Rue, 72 So.2d 47 (FI. 1954)-See the case of Diem v. Diem, 141
193 So. 65 (1940) as authority for the Court's ruling.
FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (8)(1953).
Dwyer v. Dwyer, 72 So.2d 378 (IFla, 1954).
Epstein v. Epstein, 73 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1954).
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alleging that a suit for divorce a mensa et thoro was pending in Washington,
D.C., a judgment had been entered in that suit whereby the wife received
title to certain real property, and such suit operated as res judicata
or estoppel by judgment. The Supreme Court held otherwise, stating that
the causes of action were entirely different. In the Washington suit the
wife merely alleged desertion and cruelty as grounds for separate maintenance, the ground for habitual intemperance was not in issue in the
Washington suit but was an issue in Florida, and the evidence was more
than sufficient to sustain the chancellor in finding that the wife had been
guilty of habitual intemperance. 48
ALIMONY

49

The mere pendency in the state of rendition (Ohio) of a petition for
modification of alimony and support money in a final decree of divorce
did not preclude the collection of accrued installments by suit in Florida.
Our view of the law on this proposition is that where the law of
the state of rendition (Ohio) is that accrued installments of
alimony or support mngney under its decree may be modified at
some subsequent date, that factor, and that factor alone, will
prevent collection of accrued installments in the Courts of another
jurisdiction, under the full faith and credit clause, without regard
to whether a Petition has, or has not, been filed in the State of
rendition prior to the institution of suit in a foreign jurisdiction.
The court went on to say that under Ohio law, accrued alimony payments
are in the nature of a judgment, not subject to modification unless the
decree making the order specifically provides that past due as well as
subsequent payments may be modified by the court making the original
iudement. 50

In Evans v. Evans, wife No. 2 filed a petition to increase the
alimony provisions of a divorce decree and the husband filed a petition
to decrease the amount of alimony payments. The facts showed that the
husband had been in ill health, his dental practice had declined, his real
estate was well incumbered and wife No. 1 had to forego some of
her alimony payments in order that the husband could make payments
to wife No. 2. The court stated that "the goose now laying the egg
should not be killed for some temporary desire or need"; the Court therefore
reduced the alimony for wife No. 2 from $40.00 to $25.00 per week."
48. Roy v. Roy, 73 So.2d 294 (Fla. 1954).

49, The author would like to refer the readers to an Article written by Judge
Morris Ploscowe entitled Is There a Right Amount of Alimony?, Coronet Magazine, Vol.
37, No. 6, page 140, April, 1955. Although this article is not directed towards lawyers,
the author feels that every judge, lawyer, and law student would learn a great deal from
reading it. It is submitted that there is more common sense in this article than any
other article the author has seen in regard to what amount of alimony can he awarded

without thereby impoverishing the husband and starving the wife.
50. Wolk v. Leak, 70 So.2d 498 (Fla. 19541.
51. Evans v. Evans, 70 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1954).
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In an involved situation, a wife sought a decree of divorce from bed
and board in Pennsylvania, applying for alimony, and later the husband
sued for absolute divorce in that state. Then the husband came to Florida
and instituted a divorce suit; the wife asked that the suit in Florida be
stayed because of the pendcncy of the Pennsylvania case but the Supreme
Court approved refusal of her request. Having exhausted her remedy to
stay the proceedings in Florida, she filed an answer in Florida and prayed
for temporary alimony, suit moncy and attorneys fees. The Supreme Court
stated she was not entitled to a double award of alimony, i.e., alimony
under the Pennsylvania decree and the Florida law. The lower court had
awarded her "nominal" attorneys fees of $500.00 but denied her any suit
money. The Supreme Court reversed, in part, and said she was entitled
52
to suit money under the same basis as her request for attorneys fees.
Where the facts showed that the husband was worth about $98,000.00,
but was financially heavily involved, his main income consisted of $3,600.00
a year from a hotel, the wife had worked in the past and they both had
been married before, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of a total
alimony of $4,000.00, payable at $50.00 per week, with additional attorneys'
fees of $500.00, together with $250.00 which had been previously awarded.
The decree was apparently based upon the fact that the wife had contributed to the financial and emotional difficulties of the marriage rather
than to their financial and emotional welfareA3
A husband and wife purchased property as tenants by the entirety,
the wife contributing about $3,000.00 and the husband about $800.00. They
later built a restaurant on the property, both going into debt to build it.
The wife was the actual manager of the restaurant, the husband not
contributing anything constructive to the operation because of his getting
drunk, nagging and "spitting" on the wife in the presence of customers.
The Supreme Court awarded her all of the real estate and relieved the
husband of any claim of alimony, suit money, costs and attorneys fees.
The court pointed out that the Florida Statutes 4 authorize the payment
of alimony in a lump sum and cases 5 5 support the view that a court of
equity may decree all property owned by the entireties to the wife or to
the husband, or divide it equally between them and thus give full relief
and close the matter in litigation. The court went on to say:
In view of the picture presented by the record we think the
Chancellor was authorized by Scction 65.08 Florida Statutes 1951,
F.S.A., to enter the order he did. He had power to make a lump
sum award for alimony, both parties were satisfied with the divorce,
the business was small and the wife was the only one who had
52. Harrison v. Harrison, 71 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1954).
53. Pross v. Pross, 72 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1954).
54. FLA. STAT. § 65.08 (1953).
55. Bezanilla v. Bezanilla 65 So.Zd 754 (Fla. 1953) and Fuller v. Fuller, 38 So.2d

51 (Fla, 1948).
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shown capacity to conduct it. Under the circumstances the decree
entered by the Chancellor was the only one that comported with
reason. "
In Chastain v. Chastain where the husband was the owner of one of the
finest cattle ranches in the country composed of about 31,000 acres worth
approximately $1,500,000.00, not including the herd of cattle, and had
other assets worth $107,000.00, with total liabilities of $70,000.00, the chancellor awarded to the wife the sum of $700.00 per month as alimony, a
residence and the rent from the residence. Later, the husband petitioned
the court to modify the decree and the chancellor ordered that the alimony
payments should be reduced to $4,200.00 a year, leaving the wife with a
gross income of between $9,000.00 and $10,000.00 a year, the difference
being made up by the rent from the residence. In the original decree
the chancellor stated that to determine the husband's ability one must
consider the nature of his capital assets, as well as his income. In the
hearing for modification there was no showing that the husband's income
had appreciably decreased. The Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor
in his modifying of his decree by stating:
A final decree of divorce awarding alimony should not be modified
as to alimony without a strong showing that the husband's ability
to pay has depreciated, The burden is upon the complaining party
to make this strong showing. Income alone is not necessarily the
test in determining the ability to pay. As pointed out by the
Chancellor in the final decree awarding divorce and fixing alimony,
,one must consider the nature of his capital assets, as well as his
income.'
The court went on to say, regarding the fact that the husband's ranch
was operating at a loss, that this loss had not seriously increased since the
rendition of the final decree in the divorce action and therefore the
chancellor was in error in modifying the decree absent a strong showing
57
of a serious change in the husband's financial position.
In Horn v. Horn the lower court entered a decree of divorce against
the husband and he filed a notice of appeal. After the notice of appeal
was filed the court entered an order requiring the husband to pay the
wife's attorneys $1,000.00 as temporary counsel fees and court costs "needed
by the plaintiff to protect and defend her rights upon the appeal brought
by the defendant herein." Subsequent to this order the lower court
entered an order judging the husband in contempt for failure to pay accumulated alimony payments under the final decree and the order provided
that the appeal should operate as a supersedcas upon the defendant filing
a bond in the sum of $1,000.00, conditioned to pay the wife all awards
made to date. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and stated that once
an appeal had been perfected jurisdiction becomes vested in the Supreme
56. Halberstadt v. Halberstadt, 72 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1954).
57. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1954).
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Court, and the lower court loses all jurisdiction over the matter except
in the case where the appealing party fails to post a supersecdeas bond,
which permits the lower court to enforce a decree made therein. In addition
the lower court was wholly without power to enter an order requiring the
payment of counsel fees and costs in connection with the appeal. If
necessity existed for such temporary counsel fees the proper forum was
the Supreme Court. 58
A husband was placed in contempt of court for his failure to pay
accrued alimony, but he was allowed the privilege of purging the contempt
by paying the accrued alimony and by posting a penal bond to insure
compliance with the "financial requirements of the final decree." The
husband paid the accrued alimony and then filed a petition for certiorari
in the Supreme Court, which held: (1) since the petitioner voluntarily made the payments required by the order and was thereupon released
from custody, that portion of the contempt order was not subject to
review.
(2) the petition, by which this contempt proceeding was
instituted by the divorced wife, dealt solely with the accrued sum in
arrears and contained no reference to future installments of alimony or
any request that security be required for their payment, and there was no
definite proof that the defaulting husband had been guilty of numerous
prior defaults. Under the Florida Statutes 9 , there was sufficient authority
in Florida whereby the courts may modify a decree of divorce in regard
to alimony and require the husband to give security for the future payments. However, in this case there was not a sufficient predicate in the
pleading and proof, and consequently, there was not a proper modification
of the final decree and the bond requirement was irregular. It appears
that if the wife had alleged that there had been a change of circumstances
because of the husband's failure to cooperate in making alimony payments,
then the court would have been warranted in modifying the decree by
imposing a bond or other security measure designed to secure the wife
in receiving future alimony."
A husband filed suit for divorce and the wife filed a counterclaim
praying for a divorce, counsel fees, alimony and court costs. The husband
was a disabled war veteran receiving a pension of $141.00 a month. During
their marriage, of one year, the husband had given one-half of his real
property to the wife making them tenants in common. There was no proof
that the wife assisted the husband in the accumulation of money or
property during their marriage. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court on the grounds that by the terms of the final decree the husband
had been virtually stripped of all of the remainder of his property, the
court stating:
58, Horn v. Horn, 73 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
59. FLA. STAT. §§ 65.08 and 65.15 (1953).
60. Stern v. Stem, 75 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1954).
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While we do not suggest that the husband should not be required
to pay alimony, attorney's fees and costs of suit, it does appear
to us that the decree went too far in respect to the award granted;
particularly in view of the fact that the counterclaim did not
contain a prayer for an award of that nature but that only alimony,
attorney's fees and court costs be decreed. . . \We are constrained
to the view that . . . a lump sum award should be made only in

those instances where some special equities might require it or
make it advisable; for instance, where the wife may have brought
to the marriage, or assisted her husband in accumulating, property
and where it is clearly established that the husband has assets
sufficient in amount to pay the gross award . . .
Justice Terrell filed a strong dissent based upon a Statute6 ' which permits
payment of lump sum alimony as from the circumstances of the parties
and nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just, and Justice Terrell
felt that the Chancellor, not the Supreme Court is the determiner of what
2
is "fit, equitable and just."
Upon remand of the above case, the wife, with leave of court, amended
her counterclaim to ask for the properties of the husband as a lump sum
alimony award, and the husband brought certiorari. The Supreme Court
held that its previous opinion having decided that the wife was not entitled to the husband's property, the Chancellor should have entered an
order based on the record then before him.63
In a case which may go down in Florida legal history as the "Husband's
Magna Carta," the lower court entered a decree of divorce in favor of the
wife, but denied her request for alimony and required the costs of the litigation (except the reporter's fee) to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale
of certain property owned by the parties jointly, the remainder of the proceeds to be divided equally between them. The only asset of the parties was
the home and its furnishings which had been originally acquired by investing the savings of the husband and upon which the payments were thereafter made by him until he departed from the martial domicile. The wife
made payments on the home but she also received an allowance of about
$25.00 a month from the Federal Government as a wife of a disabled veteran.
The master found that the wife had completely recovered from a nervous
disability caused by her marriage and was well able to support herself. The
husband had a service connected disability and was without accumulated
savings except the home which represented an investment of all of his savings. The court stated:
Times have now changed. The broad, practically unlimited opportunities for women in the business world of today are a matter
of common knowledge.
61.

FLA. STATr. §

Thus, in an era where the opportunities

65.08 (1953).

62. Goode v. Goode, 76 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1954).
2;6 (1955).
63. Goode v. Goode, 80 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1955).
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for self-support by the wife are so abundant, the fact that the marriage has been brought to an end because of the fault of the husband does not necessarily entitle the wife to be forever supported
by a former husband who has little, if any, more economic
advantages than she has. We do not construe the marriage status,
once achieved, as conferring on a former wife of a ship-wrecked
marriage the right to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and
little incentive on her part to apply such talent as she may possess
in making her own way.
The court went on to say that the Chancellor did not abuse his discretion
in refusing to grant alimony to the wife, but that the portion of decree which
assessed one-half of the costs of the litigation against the wife had to be
reversed under the authority of the Kneale 4 case.(1 It is submitted that
this case may have a far-reaching effect. To the knowledge of the writer,
it is the first case where the Supreme Court has faced reality in holding that
the wife and the husband should be treated on somewhat the same plane
of equality. To the writer it does seem rather strange that the Legislature
has been so prone to pass emancipation acts Vbt women while retaining the
view that a wife is still a privileged litigant in a domestic matter. It is submitted that it would behoove the men of Florida to petition the Legislature to pass bills emancipating men.
Pursuant to a wife's application, the lower court sentenced a husband
to six months in jail for failure to pay past due alimony. Twelve days later,
the court, without giving the wife notice, cancelled all future alimony to
the wife. The Supreme Court stated that it was error to enter this order
without notice to the wife, and, in addition, that the husband had never
Statutes," hence
complied with the modification provisions of the Florida
67
modification.
a
for
record
the
in
basis
there was no
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN

The Legislature has finally enacted a statute which provides that any
party to an action who in violation of a court order, leads, takes, entices or
removes a child from the State with personal knowledge of the order, shall
be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not to exceed five years.6 8 It is submitted that as a
practical matter, a judge or a jury might not be too inclined to convict
a person who takes or removes his or her own child.
Where a wife of a sailor serving in the Korean theater, abandoned
her two children and went through a marriage ceremony with a man in
New York, the lower court granted the husband a divorce but because of
the tender age of the children awarded their custody to the wife. The
64. Kneale v. Kneale. 67 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1953).

65. Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1955).

66. FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1953).
67. Attaway v. Attaway, 80 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1955).
68. Laws of la., e.29654 (1955).
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Supreme Court affirmed the decree (which was, of all things, based upon
cruelty!) but granted custody of the children to the father because the
mother's actions fell "far short of measuring up to the degree of care and
devotion to her family normally expected of a wife and mother." 69
Where a mother resided in Dade County, the father and children
resided in Orange County, and the mother brought contempt proceedings
in Dade County, it was error for the Chancellor to order the father to
transfer the children to the mother during the proceedings because the
venue statute 0 gives the defendant the privilege to be sued in the county
where the subject matter in litigation is located, and the subject matter of
a child custody case is the child.7 ' A new statute7 2 does not change this
result, because it only applies to the enforcement of decrees "for the payment
of alimony or support money for children or both" and provides that such
actions may be brought in the county where the person charged with its
73
payments resides.
A husband and wife were divorced with the wife being awarded custody
of their two children. She was later killed in an accident and the lower
court modified the divorce decree and gave custody to the father. The
Supreme Court reversed, gave custody of the children to the wife's mother
and ordered the lower court to award support money for the children. 4
The Chancellor, upon remand of the case, was apparently irate at the Supreme Court's actions and awarded a pitiful sum for their support. The
Supreme Court, in unusually harsh language, reversed the Chancellor and
ordered the suni of $20.00 per week for support of the children and also
awarded attorney's fee to be paid for by the husband. 75
A five year old child had spent her entire life in the custody of her
mother. The lower court entered a divorce decree in favor of the husband
and awarded him custody. The husband was a serviceman and had no
definite intentions of returning to Florida. The Supreme Court reversed,
stating that ordinarily the welfare of a young child was best advanced by
being in the mother's custody and therefore they felt that the mother, at
least initially, was entitled to custody of the child and to a reasonable
allowance for its support and maintenance. The court noted that the
effect of the order of the lower court was to place the child with strangers
(relatives of the husband) miles from the life long home place of the

69. Phillips v. Phillips, 67 So.2d 325 (Fla. 1953).
70. FLA. STAT. § 46.01 (1953).
71. Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So2d 734 (1941), compare with James
v. James, 64 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1953), which modifies the Donran case to some extent
where both parties submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a court which has no iurisdiction over the children.
72. Laws of Fla., c.28187 (1953).
73. Waterhouse v. Pringle, 68 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1953 ).
74. Cone v. Cone-Evans, 62 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1953).
75. Cone v. Cone, 68 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1953).
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mother and the child without a substantial showing of any necessity therefor.7 6
The lower court awarded custody of a six year old child to the father.
The ultimate question was whether the paternal or the maternal grandparents should rear the child during its custody. The paternal grandparents
had custody of the child for two years in Daytona Beach, Florida, and
the maternal grandparents resided in Dallas, Texas. There was no showing that the environment at the maternal grandparent's home in Dallas
would be equal to, or superior to, the paternal grandparent's home in
Florida. The court awarded custody to the paternal grandparents, stating:
It is too well settled for cavil that all things be equal, the mother
will be awarded the custody of children of tender years in a controversy like this. It is apparent from the record that the attitudes
of the parents in this case were such that a suitable environment
for the children to grow up was not in prospect. . . .As between
the father and mother the record may show that the mother was
better qualified but on account of the situation confronting him the
Chancelor was not in error in placing the child with the paternal
grandparents since there was no showing of conditions at the maternal 7grandmother's home or her ability and qualification to care
for it.
A mother based her case upon the allegations that the father had
poisoned the mind of their oldest son against the mother and that she was
in fear that he would do the same thing with their youngest boy. The
court stated that there was not sufficient evidence to show this alleged
mental poisoning. The court went on to say, "But-solely for the sake of
argument-even if the record could be interpreted to sustain such finding,
it would constitute no legal basis for denying the father partial custody of
78
his young son."
In a proceeding to modify a final decree of child custody, the defendant
is not entitled to actual service of process, but he is unquestionably entitled
to adequate and proper notice of the new proceedings. In the instant case,
more than eight months after a final decree, the plaintiffs filed an amended
petition and served a copy on the attorney that had represented the defendants in the original case. There was no proof that the said attorney
was still the defendant's attorney and no notice was served on the defendants
personally. The court stated,
\Vhatever may be the status and rationale of the decisions in other
jurisdictions, we hold that after a final decree has been entered and
the time for appeal therefrom has expired, no presumption exists
that the attorney of record for any party in the original action has
76. Shores v.Shores, 69 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1954).
77. Zdanowicz v.Zdanowicz, 70 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1954).
78. Jones v. Oakes, 71 So.2d 252, (Fla. 1954). This case also decided other
custody questions which the author feels are not of sufficient general interest to be mentioned in this article.
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authority effectively to bind that party in any subsequent proceedings to modify that decree in the absence of his actual appearance
therein. The service of notice, alone, on such attorney is not sufficient to empower the lower court to proceed in the cause. 7"
A wife filed suit for divorce against her husband in the state of Illinois,
praying for a divorce, custody of a minor child of the parties, alimony, child
support and other relief. The defendant filed a personal appearance in the
cause but failed to answer. A final decree was entered granting a divorce
to the plaintiff awarding her sole care, and custody of the minor child and
retaining jurisdiction until some further date as to the actual amount of
the support and maintenance for said minor child. Approximately two
years after the divorce, the wife filed a petition in the Illinois court asking
that the court enter an award for child support and the court granted an
award of $7.00 per week. Approximately nine years later, the plaintiff received a money judgment in Illinois for the accrued amount. Subsequently,
the wife instituted suit in Florida, against the defendant for the purpose
of enforcing the Illinois dccree both as to delinquent support money and
for the future weekly installments. The defendant filed an answer attacking the jurisdiction of the Illinois court decree both as to the delinquent
support money and for future weekly installments, on the grounds that
he had not authorized the written appearance filed in his behalf. The
court held that when the husband had remarried, relying upon a decree of
divorce entered against him, he is estopped to attack the divorce under the
well recognized rule that when a defendant, in a foreign decree of divorce,
does some act, which in itself recognizes the validity of the decree, he is
estopped from afterward impeaching the decree. The court further held
that no notice was apparently given to the defendant for the application of
support money for the child, and under the law of Illinois, procedural due
process required some form of notice be given in such cases. Therefore,
the decree of Illinois, under the pleadings, was not entitled to full faith and
credit.8 0
The court seemed to say that unless a party, who is denied custody
of children, requests reasonable visitation privileges, then the Chancellor is
at liberty to enter a decree of custody to the other spouse denying the losing
party the right to visit the children.8 '
The court reversed the lower court when it stated, in general terms,
that conditions had changed since the entry of a prior order modifying
custody, because the record did not contain:
. . . any substantial, competent evidence that there has been any
material or substantial change in conditions which bear upon or
relate to the question of advisable changes in the custody provisions
79. Moore v. Lee, 72 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1954).
80. Reichert v. Appell, 74 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1954).
81. Thompson v. Thompson, 72 So.Zd 392 (Fla. 1954).
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relative to the children or indicate in any manner that their welfare
will be promoted by a change in the provisions of that decree.
The Supreme Court further held that the husband has a right to send the
children to either public or private schools and that it is not within the
power of the court to tell the parents what kind of schools their children
shall attend. The court further reversed the Chancellor in awarding
$3,500.00 to the wife for the cost and expenses and upkeep of the two minor
children during the six week period in the summer when she had custody
of them, and the court also reversed by saying that thcre was no basis in
the record for the award of $250.00 expenses to the wife for attending the
hearing on her petition for modification. "
In a very unusual case, a modified decree provided that the foster
mother of a 13 year old girl would be permitted to visit the girl at such
times and places as the girl may desire. The Supreme Court affirmed this
unusual decree on the basis that the foster mother (the child was an adopted
daughter of the foster mother) had become an alcoholic and the foster
daughter had very little respect for her. The court mentioned that the
Chancellor felt that under such circumstances, an order requiring the child
to visit her foster mother would be unwise, and refused to grant it.83 It is
submitted that this is one of the most sensible decrees that the writer has
seen in regard to child custody cases.
In the case of Thompson v. Angel,8 4 the parties were divorced and
the minor child was awarded to the maternal grandmother pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties. Subsequently, both parties petitioned the court
to modify the final decree and this cause was settled by a stipulation whereby
the father secured custody of the child. The maternal grandmother, petitioned the court for permission to file a bill in the nature of a bill of review
for the purpose of setting aside the modifying decree because it was allegedly
based upon the fraud and deceit of the parties. The Supreme Court held
that even though the grandmother was acting as next friend of the minor
child, neither the child nor the grandmother had any standing in court
because neither was a party to the stipulation. "The right to present
such a stipulation was peculiar to the parties who stipulated." The court
felt that the Chancellor had exercised his discretion properly and had kept
uppermost in his mind the welfare of the child.
Tel] months after the Chancellor ordered that custody of a minor
child be awarded to the father, the Chancellor modified the decree by
giving the father custody except on certain holidays and certain months,
during which time the mother was to have custody. The father appealed,
and the Supreme Court mentioning that both the mother and father
were liquor addicts but that the mother was staging a "come-back" and
82. Bennett v. Bennett, 73 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1954).
83. Kelly v. Kelly, 73 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1954).
84. Thompson v. Angel, 74 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1954).
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that she was from a "respectable family," upheld the Chancellor in making
the partial change of custody. 5
A wife left her husband and returned to her parents' home. The
husband paid all of the expenses incident to the birth of their child and
since the birth had paid the sum of $25.00 per week for its support.
The wife filed a complaint asking the court to order the husband to
continue making said payments. The Supreme Court, affirming the lower
court, in its dismissal of the suit, held that there was no controversy between
the parties, because the husband had made the support payments, the
wife admitted that they were sufficient, and that the husband had not
threatened to cease making the payments nor had he in any way interfered
with the custody of the child. 6
A husband and wife were residents of Pennsylvania. The husband
left the wife and took their two children with him to Florida. Subsequently,
the vife came to Florida and surreptitiously took the children back to
Pennsylvania and the husband filed suit in Florida to secure their custody.
The wife filed a motion to dismiss, which was overruled and she brought
certiorari, which was granted, the court stating:
. . . This court is committed to the doctrine that when he
custody of minor children is involved they must be in the jurisdiction
of the court before the question will be considered or adjudicated.
There may be exceptions to this if the Mother is personally in
the court's jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rasco v. Rasco, 139 Fla. 349,
190 So.510; May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.528, 73 S. Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed.
1221, and James v. James, Fla., 64 So.2d 534; Kallet v. Fitzpatrick,
Sup., 131 N.Y.S. 9.
The court further held this was a proceeding in personam against a
non-resident defendant, and therefore only the courts of Pennsylvania
have jurisdiction over the wife and minor children."7
In a case of first impression, a husband and wife entered into a contract
in 1928, whereby the husband agreed to pay fifteen dollars a week for the
support of their minor child and a divorce was subsequently entered
between the parties. The minor child reached his majority in 1947, and
the husband died in 1952. The wife filed suit in 1953 seeking to recover
$14,000.00 as the arrearages for the period from 1927 to 1947. The court
stated that despite the fact that the father has a continuing obligation to
support his child, the Statute of Limitations 5 began to run against each
payment as it came due, and therefore the liability of the decedent's
estate was limited to unpaid installments which fell due within five years
85. Bryan v. Bryan, 75 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1954).
86. York v. York, 78 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1955). The reader is referred to the companion case of York v. York, 78 So.2d 408 (Fla. 1955) determining the question of
venue in this case.
87. Cessler v. Cessler, 78 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1955).
88. FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (3) (1953).
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ncxt preceding tile dcath of the decedent. In a strong dissent, Justice
Terrcll (with whose opinion justices Thomas and Sandier concurred)

considered that the contract is a continuing one and that the Statute
of Limitations begins to run on all weekly payments from the date the
minor child reached his majority.8 9 Under the fine law and logic presented
by both sides of the court, the author is constrained to the view that
this is a case where reasonable men may differ.
Public assistance may now be given to a dependent child, under
one year of age, if the parent or other relative with whom the child is
living has resided in the state for one year immediately preceding the
application for assistance. 0 This amendment would seem to encourage
out of state parents to ship their children (if under one year of age) to
Florida relatives and thereby place an additional load on the taxpayers of
this State.
The Legislature has rcpcaled the Uniform Support of Dependents
Law, 9 ' enacted in 1953, and has enacted the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act8 2 as a substitute. The main improvement of the new
act seems to be in the provision for extradition of any person "found
in such other state who is charged in this state with the crime of failing
to provide for the support of any person in this state .
SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

A wife sued her husband for separate maintenance unconnected with
causes for divorce. The lower court refused to allow her attorneys fees
3'
and she appealed. The Supreme Court held that under the Statutes ,
the granting of attorneys fees is not mandatory but within the sound
judicial discretion of the Chancellor and the court affirmed a finding that
the wife was worth approximately $100,000.00 and therefore there was no
need for the wife to be awarded attorneys fees. "'
The lower court awarded the wife's attorneys $500.00 as a fee in a
case of separate maintenance and the Supreme Court refused to grant
an additional award, but in regard to suit money, the court held that
the wife is entitled to an award against the husband for the actual
travelling expenses of her counsel from Miami to Tallahassee pursuant
to the Schubert h9f' case?
89. Issacs v. Deutsch, 80 So.2d 657 (1955).
of

90. Laws of Fla., c.29670 (1955) amending paragraph (b) of Sub section (1)
(1953).
88.01-88.12, Laws of Fl., c.27996 (1953).
92. Laws of Fla., c.29907 (1955).
93. FLA. S'rAT. §§ 65.09, 65.10 (1953).
94. McFarlin v. McFarlin, 75 So.Zd 580 (FIa. 1954).
95. Schuberth v.Schuberth, 52 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1951).
96. Borodowsky v. Borndowsky, 78 So.2d 868 (Ila. 1955).

FLA. STAT. § 409.18
91 FLA. STAT. §§

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
.IIONIYS'

FEES AND COURT COSTS, MASTERS' FEES AND

MIASTERS'

REPORTS

In a case involving 800 pages of testimony and three years of litigation,
the court affirmed an award of $15,000.00 to the wife's attorneys, but
reduced the master's fees from $3,000.00 to $1,500.00.OT
Where the lower court assessed the court costs equally between both
parties, the Supreme Court affirmed the decree on the merits, but reversed
as to court costs and assessed all of them against the husband. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court may have possibly ruled this way
because of their stinging verbal slap at the quality of the husband's brief
and the size of the appellate record.9 8
In the case of McMullan v. McMullan,99 the Supreme Court held
that, notwithstanding the lack of exceptions to the master's report, the
Chancellor should have dismissed the cross bill as well as the bill.
In the case of Touby v. Touby, 100 where over 700 pages of testimony
were adduced before a master during ten separate hearings, the court
affirmed an award of $5,000.00 as attorneys' fees for the wife's attorney,
but reduced the master's fee from $1,600.00 to $750.00.
The court has finally ruled' 0 ' that a whole case should not be referred
to a master to make findings of facts and conclusions of law unless both
parties consent to the order of reference. However, the court did say:
that the special masters may be appointed to serve in a ministerial
capacity to perform a 'particular service', if the chancellor in his
discretion decides that such action is necessary to aid the Court in
an accurate and expeditious determination of the cause. The
validity of these appointments for limited service will not be
affected by the want of agreement on the part of litigants, or even
their protest, and the reports of Special 1\4asters in such cases shall
be advisory.
In regard to the submission of the whole case to a master the court said:
If a party moves for the reference of the entire cause to a special
master and there is no objection, or the adversaries consent, then
there is tacit or express waiver of the right to have the Chancellor
hear the witnesses without cost to the litigants of a fee for expert
appraisal of the testimony. And if that procedure is followed, the
chancellor, though he is the final arbiter with power to dispose
of the dispute by decree, may not put aside the findings of fact
unless they are clearly 'erroneous'."

97. Kleinschmidt v. Kleinschmidt, 66 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1953),
98. Kneale v. Kneale, 67 So.2d 233 (Fla, 1953).
99. McMullan v. MeMullan, 68 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1953).
100. Touby v. Touby, 68 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1953). Note this case as reported in
66 So.2d 222 was withdrawn by the court.
101. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1954); accord, Frank v. Frank, 75 So.2d.
282 (Fla. 1954).
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SEPARATION ACREEMENTS

The parties were married in Florida and a child was born to them.
Later, the husband left the wife, moved to Missouri, and filed suit for
divorce. The wife, still a resident of Florida, entered into a property
settlement and child support agreement which was incorporated by the
Missouri Court in its final decree of divorce in 1946. The husband complied
in every way with this final decree which was entered in 1946. In 1952,
the wife filed a petition 0 2 asking the Florida Court to modify the separation
agreement and the Missouri decree as to the amount of support payments
because of an increase in the husband's income.
Personal service in
Florida was had upon the husband who was vacationing here. The
court held: (1) the Florida Court has no power to modify or alter
retroactively, a final judgment of a sister state."' (2) however, the law of
Missouri, like the law of Florida, holds that a decree for child support
is subject to revision upon proof of a change in circumstances of the
parties, hence the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not stand as a constitutional bar to this suit. (3) citing a Massachusetts case,' 0 ' the court
held that it has no jurisdiction to modify the Missouri decree but only to
supersede it upon a proper showing of changed financial circumstances
105
of the father and the reasonable needs of the child.
Husband and wife no. 1 entered into a separation agreement whereby,
among other things, the wife was to be removed as a beneficiary from
her husband's insurance policy and her three children were to be named
the new beneficiaries. This agreement was approved by the court which
entered a decree of divorce between the parties. Later, the husband
remarried and named wife no. 2 (who paid the premiums on the policy)
as beneficiary, leaving out his children. The husband died and the children
claimed the proceeds as against wife no. 2. The court held that the
beneficiary had only an inchoate right in the proceeds of the policy and
the insured had the absolute right to change the policy since the policy
permitted him to do so. The court mentioned that the children might
have some claim against the estate of the father but the question was not
decided.106
During the pendency of a cause for a divorce, the husband and wife
stipulated that she would receive certain properties and that she would
not ask for alimony in the final decree. A final decree was entered in
accordance with the stipulation of the parties. Subsequently, the former
wife filed a petition for modification' 0 1 because of a large increase in the
husband's income. The court held that a wife who has accepted money
102. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 65.15 (1953).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 1.
Ourfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).
Lopez v. Avery, 66 So.2d 6R9 (Fla. 1953).
Cadore v, Cadore, 67 So.2d 635 (Fla 1953).
Pursuant to Fr. S'AT. § 65.15 (1953).
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and property is estopped to maintain statutory proceedings to modify
the decree and require the husband to pay additional money, the court
stating:
However, this Court has never construed the Statute providing
for the modification of alimony 'payments' Section 65.15, Supra,
to permit an award of alimony; when a wife has, without fraud or
duress, relinquished her right to alimony, in consideration of the
conveyance or payment to her of property or money pursuant to a
comprehensive property settlement agreement, and such an agreement has been fully executed and performed ..

..

To the contrary,

it will be found that in every instance where a petition for modification has been considered on its merits, and a new alimony award
made or denied, on the ground of changed circumstances since
the execution of a property settlement agreement or stipulation
between the parties, the Court has granted such relief because
the agreement involved was executory in nature, and, in most cases
did not purport to be a final relinquishment of alimony but merely
settled the question of what periodic payments would be satisfactory to the parties, so as to obviate the taking of testimony on
that issue. (Emphasis supplied by the court) 18
A husband and wife entered into a separation agreement which
provided, inter alia, that if the wife through no fault, neglect or omission,
on her part would be put out of her home, then the monthly allowance
for the support of a child would be increased to $125.00 per month. The
former husband later brought a partition suit against the wife and she
and the child were forced to vacate the home. The Chancellor therefore
increased the amount of support. At the hearing before the lower court,
the proceedings were not transcribed. The Supreme Court stated that
because of the absence of a record, they were unable to state that the
Chancellor was in error in his construction of the separation agreement
and what aids the Chancellor used in deciding that the wife was forced
to vacate her home through no fault, neglect or omission on her part. 109
Before a divorce suit was filed, the parties executed a separation
agreement and during the hearing of the suit, a further addition to the
agreement was agreed upon which stated that if the premises which the
wife was conveying to the husband were sold during the occupancy of
the wife, the wife should be entitled to all furnishings, furniture and
equipment contained in the beauty shop and apartments occupied by
the wife. The lower court entered a decree in accordance with the
separation agreement, as modified, and about a year afterwards the wife
instituted a suit for declaratory decree stating that it was the intention
of the parties that the wife was to have the right to occupy the property
so long as she should live, or until she should remarry, and that if such
were not the legal effect of the agreement it was to be reformed to so
108. Haynes v. Haynes, 71 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1954).
109. James v. Keith, 78 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1955).
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provide. The Supreme Court did not agree with her contentions, the
court stating:
The wife misinterprets the following sentence in Paragraph 4
of the agreement, viz: "The husband agrees to further give the
wife all furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment contained
in beauty shop and apartment occupied by the wife for her use
until such time as she may vacate premises of her own accord
or remarry." The wife applies the words, "for her use until such
time as she may vacate premises of her own accord or remarry,
to the beauty shop and the apartment whereas we think such words
are applicable only to the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
equipment. This is especially true when we bear in mind that
the preceding sentence provides for the payment by the husband
of the sum of $4,000.00 in cash to the wife "in complete payment
for support, alimony or interest which the wife may have in the
property owned by the parties" . . . . Moreover, the evidence of
the parties before the master to the effect that in the event that
the husband sold the property during the wife's occupancy she
would be entitled to all of such furniture and fixtures clearly
supports the conclusion that her right of occupancy extended only
so Tong as the husband owned the property or until she remarried. 1
A separation agreement was entered into and a Nevada court entered
a decree of divorce between the parties. A New York court entered a
judgment allegedly for all sums due the wife under the separation agreement. The wife brought an equity action in Florida for an accounting
and enforcement of payments under the agreement and the husband
moved to have the case transferred to the law side of the court. The
court stated: (1) basically the wife's complaint is merely one to
enforce a decree ordering payment of alimony and it was therefore
appropriate to invoke equity jurisdiction.
(2) arguments based upon
the laws of Nevada and New York were unavailing because there was a
complete absence of the foreign law in the pleadings and proof in the
case. The Uniform Judieial Notice of Foreign Law Act- does not
operate automatically in every case. The litigant desiring to take advantage
of this provision must give reasonable notice to the adverse party either
in the pleadings or otherwise.
(3) under the pleadings, there was
some basis for an action in equity, and the court refused to decide
whether some portions of the action related solely to a law action, the
severability of an equity suit or whether a portion of an equity action
may be transferred to the law side of the court.11 2
ADOPTION

The legislature has amended certain sections of the Adoption Laws11 a
relative to investigations prior to adoption, appointment of guardians
110. Clark v. Clark, 79 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1955).
11t. FLA.

STAT. § 92.031 (1953).
112. Kingston v. Quimby, 80 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1955).
113. FLA. STAT. §§ 72.08, 72.15, 72.17, 72.18, and 72.20 (1953).
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ad litem in certain circumstances, hearing times, and removal of custody
of a child upon denial of adoption. 114 The most important change is
the repealing of the interlocutory order of adoption provision 1 5 which
provided for interlocutory custody for a period not to exceed one year.
Now the only decree is a final one. 116
Section 72.2717 of the Adoption Law was amended so that the
name of the minor shall not be noted on any docket, index or other
record outside of the court file in such proceeding.
It is submitted
that this drawing of an "Iron Curtain" across the name of the minor may
have evil effects in that anyone attempting to trace the minor would
be practically unable to do so; i.e., if one or both of the natural parents
were never informed (by fraud of the adopting parents) of the adoption
proceedings, they would probably be unable to ever trace the whereabouts
of their child.
Section 72.34111 of the Adoption Law was amended so as to remove
the former requirement that the adopters should have had custody of
an adult adoptee for at least five years during the infancy of such adoptee.
PROPERTY AND TORTS

Property
For an interesting case involving the transfer of title to an automobile
by a husband to his wife on the day he was served with a summons
in a common law action, and the questions of procedure and due process
raised by the wife in supplementary proceedings see the first Dezen 19 case.
In the second Dezen case, the judgment creditor sought to enforce
a judgment against the cash surrender value of certain life insurance
policies issued on the life of the judgment debtor. A writ of garnishment
was served upon the insurance company and the Supreme Court stated
that the Life Insurance Exemption Statute 120 extends to the case where
the insurance policies were purchased out of the state by a non-resident
who thereafter became a resident of Florida. The court pointed out
that if the judgment creditor proved that the policy was purchased in
fraud of her then the exemption statute would not apply.' 21
114. Laws of Fla., c.29674 (1955).
115. FLA. STAT. § 72.19 (1953).
116. FLA. STAT. § 72.20 (1953).
117. FLA. STAT. § 72.27 (1953).
118. FLA. STAT. § 72.34 (1953).
119. Dezen v. Slateoff, 66 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1953).
120. FLA. STAT. § 222.14 (1953):
The cash surrender value of life insurance policies issued upon the lives
of citizens or residents of the State of Florida, upon whatever form, shall
not in any case be liable to attachment, garnishment or legal process in

favor of any creditor of the person whose life is so insured, unless tile
insurance policy was effected for the benefit of such creditor.
121. Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1955).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
In a case (whose facts sound like a "True Confession" story), a
husband deserted his wife and four children and went through a marriage
ceremony with wife No. 2 who did not know of the prior existing
marriage. The "husband" and wife No. 2 bought Tracts 1, 2 and 3 of
land as tenants by the entirety, and the husband took title to Tract No. 4
in his own name. The husband died and wife No. 1, and her two
surviving children, brought suit against wife No. 2, praying that they be
declared as owners in fee of Tract No. 4, and as owners of an undivided
one-half interest in Tracts 1, 2 and 3. The court decided that wife No. 2
was an innocent party and that the husband, plaintiff's ancestor, was
the actual perpetrator of the fraud and he would have been estopped
during his life time from contending that the estate created was void
because of the bigamous marriage. Therefore his heirs are bound by
the estoppel and wife No. 2 was held to be the fee simple owner of
Tracts 1, 2 and 3, and that wife No. 1 and the two children were fee
.
simple owners of Tract No. 4.2 2
Although a wife's signature on a contract of sale of homestead
property need not be acknowledged, 2 3 it is still required that the contract
be witnessed by two persons. The statute1 24 does not dispense with the
requirement of two subscribing witnesses, but only with the formal re12 5
quirement of acknowledgement.
In the case of Field v. Field,120 the lower court dismissed a suit
for divorce by the husband based upon his wife's alleged desertion; however, upon a later petition of the husband, the court ordered the wife
to sign a deed in order to convey certain real estate to a third person.
The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
In the absence of a regular business partnership, and of a dissolution of the marriage relationship, there is no occasion to undertake to adjudicate the respective rights of the spouses to property
in which both have an interest.
In the case of Reid v. Reid,127 the court held that a Chancellor had
the power to command a former husband to convey his interest in
property, which was held as an estate by the entirety at the time a
divorce vws entered, to the wife. The court pointed out that since
the court may order the husband to convey to the wife property owned
entirely by him, 281 there was no reason to hold that the Chancellor
cannot order the man to convey to the woman his undivided interest in
122. Alexander v. Colston, 66 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1953).
123. Scott v. Hotel Martinique, '48 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1950) and FLA. STAT. § 708.07
(1953).
124. FLA. STAT. § 708.07 (1953).
125. Abercrombie v. Eidschun, 66 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1953).
126. 68 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1953), Citing: Clawson v. Clawson, 54 So.2d 161 (Fla.
1951) and Pawlcy v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464, (1950).
127. 68 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1954).
128. Bezanilla v. Bezanilla, 65 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1953).
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property they now own as tenants in common, pursuant to the Florida
Statutes. 129
A daughter took care of her nother for ten years while the mother
and daughter resided in the home residence of the mother. Approximately
one year prior to the mother's death, she conveyed the home to her
daughter. One of the children contended there was fraud and deceit
and sought to have the deed set aside. The Supreme Court stated that
the ten years of service and care rendered to the mother was sufficient
consideration for the conveyance and there had not been any proof of
fraud and deceit, undue influence or duress practiced on the mother by
the daughter.18 0
A notice of application for tax deed to property held as an estate
3' was not sufficient
by the entirety, as required by the Florida Statutes,'
132
if properly mailed to only one of the spouses.
During the pendency of divorce proceedings between the parties,
the wife executed a very ungrammatical writing which seemed to show
that she agreed to give the husband all of the real property which they
owned. Later she went to the courthouse with the husband and signed
deeds conveying all of her interest in the property to him. Still later,
she filed a suit to set aside these deeds on the ground that they were
obtained by duress and coercion. The strongest part of her testimony
showed that the former husband had grabbed her and "pinched her legs"
and the Supreme Court held that such evidence was insufficient to prove
duress and coercion. 133
A divorced woman gave a man an option to purchase some real
property. It appeared that the man was allegedly acting as an agent
for her former husband and when the alleged agent requested performance
of the contract, the wife asserted that she would have charged a higher
price if she had known that her husband was the actual buyer and that
she did not want him to get the property. The court refuted her contentions by holding that she gave the option without any restrictions
as to assignment, but that on the contrary, it expressly provided in the
instrument that rights under it should enure to the other party's assigns,
therefore the other party was entitled to specific performance. 34
In the case of Medary Y. Dalnan, a widower was a devisee of a onefourth interest in certain property under his deceased wife's will. Thereafter, the widower filed a suit in equity to have a trust declared in his
favor as to the entire property claiming in substance that he had supplied
all of the funds for the purchase thereof, that the title was taken in the
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1953).
Regero v. Daughtery, 69 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1954).
FLA. STAT. § 194.18 (1953).
Montgomery v. Gipson, 69 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1954).
Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So.ld 881 (Fla. 1954).
Adams v. Stoffer, 69 So.ld 884 (Fla. 1954).
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wife's name for convenience only and that the purchase in his wife's
name was not intended as a gift or advancement to her. The court
decided that where property was purchased by the husband and title
taken in the wife's name there was no presumption of a resulting trust,
the transfer being regarded prima facie as an advancement, but, of course,
it was subject to rebuttal. The court also held that the widower was
not required to renounce the devise to him prior to his bringing the
suit.1a5
In May 1926, a husband executed a deed to his wife purporting
to convey a piece of property on which was located their homestead.
In January, 1951, the wife died and left a will leaving a portion of the
property involved to her son. The husband attacked this on the grounds
it was a homestead and that the will was ineffectual. The court held
under the Statutes of Limitations, 3 0 which provide that after a lapse
of ten years from the record of any deed no person shall assert any claims
on said land as against such claimant under such deed or the successors
in title (the instant deed being placed upon record for more than twenty
years and the claimants against said deed having been sui juris for more
than seven years prior to the institution of the suit), they were barred by
1 37
the Statutes of Limitations.
In a case, which bears out the old adage "oh what a tangled web we
wcave when once we seek to deceive," husband no. 1 and his wife
were married and he entered into a contract to purchase real property.
Later the parties were divorced and the wife remained on the property.
The wife married husband no. 2 and he used his own money and effort
in improving the property. Husband no. 1 stopped paying the wife
alimony and, in settlement of the alimony question, endorsed the land
contract for deed to her. Then husband no. 1 induced the wife to
secretly divorce husband no. 2. The wife placed the contract for deed
in the hands of a real estate broker, as evidence of her ownership, and
listed the property for sale. Husband no. 1 obtained the contract for
deed and crossed out the assignment. He then procured the deed from
the conditional vendor and executed a mortgage to a life insurance company. Later husband no. 2 unaware that he had been divorced, resumed
co-habitation with his "wife" and constructed further improvements on
the property. Later husband no. 1 and the wife were secretly remarried
but she continued to live with husband no. 2. Husband no. 1 authorized
the wife to sell the real property and she listed it for sale with the broker.
Husband no. 1 gave her two deeds signed in blank. At the closing, the
attorney refused to accept the deed signed in blank and insisted upon
husband no. 1 signing the deed. Apparently, the wife had an imposter
135. 1\edary v. Dalian, 69 So.2d 888 (Fa. 1954).
136. FtA. STAT. §§ 95.23, 95,26, and 694.08 (1953).
137. Thompson v. Thompson, 70 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
come to the closing and sign the deed repreienting himself as husband
no. 1. The wife apparently gave some of the proceeds of sale to husband
no. 1. Husband no. 1 brought a suit against the purchasers to set aside
the deed. The court held that when husband no. 1 procured a deed to
himself as the original vendee instead of to his ex-wife, to whom he had
assigned his interest, he became a trustee of a constructive trust, ex
maleficio, for his wife, and the Statute of Uses138 will not execute the
trust but equity may. Husband no. 1:
held the legal title charged, in equity, with a trust and though
the Statute of Uses will not execute a constructive trust, equity
will in this instance. Although the facts established raise doubt
as to whether she is in fact the wife of Omwake (husband
no. 1) or LaPrelle, (husband no. 2) it is of no consequence
in this case. If Marjorie is the wife of Omwake then the estoppel
applies to him. If she is the wife of LaPrelle it is of no consequence since the legal title was not vested in Marjorie or
La Prelle. The final decree was sufficient to confirm the conveyance or operate as a conveyance (see 31 F.S.A. Equity Rule
67), thereby executing the trust and making good her representations to the purchasors.' 3 9
A wife, who was the head of a family, consisting of herself and
her husband, and who was the sole owner of the home in which she and
the husband resided prior to her death, could not devise the home free
of any claim or interest on the part of the surviving husband when she
had adult children surviving her (although they did not live in the
house) because of Section 4 of Article X of the State Constitution. 4"
The fact that the children of the deceased wife were not dependent
upon her, nor were they minors, did not prevent them from being her
children, therefore, under the Constitution, she was unable to alienate
her property by will. Justice Terrell, in a strong dissent, said:
A careful reading of the Constitution and the applicable
Statutes, Sections 731.05 and 731.27, F.S.A. reveals no restraint
on alienating the homestead by will except where the owner is
survived by his wife and lineal descendants. In this case, the wife
owned the homestead and died leaving lineal descndants by a former
husband who are of age and are not contesting the will. The law imposes no restraint on her disposing of her property, as she desires, free
of any claim on the part of her surviving husband. No surviving
minor children or dependent adult lineal descendents are involved
in this case. 4 ,
138. FLA.

STAT.

§ 689.09 (1953).

139. Omwakc v. Omwake, 70 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1954).
140. This section reads:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent the holder of a
homestead from alienating his or her homestead so exempted by deed or
mortgage duly executed by himself or herself, and by husband and wife if
such relation exists; nor if the holder be without children to prevent him
or her from disposing of his or her homestead by will in a manner prescribed by law. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
141. Stephens v, Campbell, 70 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1954).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
A husband and wife purchased real property and gave a purchase
money mortgage, both signing the note and the mortgage. Later the
mortgagee assigned the note and mortgage to the wife, and the court
held that the wife could not enforce the mortgage against the husband
on the property she and her husband held as an estate by the entirety." 2
In the case of Saint-Gaudens v. Bull,' a former husband sued his
former wife and recovered a judgment. Prior to the entry of the judgment,
but during the pendency of the suit, the wife, then unmarried, filed her
claim of homestead to the property. Later she executed a warranty deed
to her daughter who was then residing with her on the property. The
wife and daughter did not live on the property from May, 1952 to April,
1953, because of the pending divorce suit, and even though the divorce
was granted on July 2, 1952, she was so emotionally disturbed over the
divorce and the immediate re-marriage of her former husband that it
was in April, 1953, before she became reconciled to the situation and
returned to her home. The court held that her absence from the home
did not amount to an abandonment of the homestead.
A father furnished a portion of the purchase price for real property
and instructed the seller to convey title to his son and daughter-in-law.
The father died and the curator of his estate filed a suit asking the court
to establish a constructive trust. The Supreme Court held that ordinarily
where the purchase money of land was paid by one person and the title
was taken in the name of another, the party taking the title is presumed
to hold it in trust for him who paid the purchase price. However, this
presumption does not arise where the legal title was taken in the name
of some person for whom the purchasor was under a legal or moral
obligation to provide. And where the father was a wealthy man and
very much interested in his son and daughter-in-law, there was a presumption of a gift rather than a presumption of a resulting trust, and
such presumption could only be overcome by evidence so clear, strong
and unequivocal as to remove every reasonable doubt as to the existence
of the gift. 14'
In the case of Brodgon v. McBride, 14" a man and woman were
married and a daughter was born as issue. Subsequently, the parties
were divorced and the father was ordered by the court to maintain and
support the daughter. Later, the father began to co-habit in his apartment
building with a woman who was not his wife. The father died leaving
a will whereby he devised the apartment house to the woman with whom
he had been co-habiting. Later this woman died devising the property
to another. The minor daughter filed suit, claiming that the apartment
142.
143.
144.
145.

BroCato v. Brocato, 74 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
Saint-Gaudens v. Bull. 74 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1954).
D'Uva v. D'Uva, 74 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1954).
Brodgon v. McBride, 75 So.d 770 (Fla. 1954).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
house was the homestead of her father. The Supreme Court held that
the minor daughter, although not residing with her father and the other
woman, was legally entitled to the father's support, therefore, under the
circumstances, the father remained the head of the family of which the
minor child was a member. The court further held that since the entire
home was under one roof and was not devisable by a perpendicular line
without destroying or eliminating a part of that occupied by the owner
as his home, the entire building was the homestead of the deceased
father.
A husband executed an option contract to sell a going business
and lots 1 and 2 on which the business was located. The contract was
signed by the husband alone, and it developed that the husband owned
lot I and an undivided one-half interest in lot 2, but that the wife
owned the remaining undivided one-half interest in lot 2. After both
parties died, the lessees tendered the anounts due under the contract
and demanded performance. The representative of the estate refused
and tie lessees brought suit for specific performance. Tle court held
that tie lessees had made valuable improvements on the un-divided onehalf interest of the wife and that they were made with her consent and
approval. As a consequence, the vendees were reimbursed for the amount
of such expenditures and the legal representative of the deceased
husband was ordered to execute a deed for lot 1 and his undivided one-half
interest in lot 2; the purchase price was abated because of the inability
of the legal representative to convey the title to the undivided one-half
interest of the deceased wife.' 46
In the case of DeJonge v. Waynej"7 the parties were divorced, and
the former husband quit claimed certain real property to the former
wife. Subsequently, the former wife remarried and later a judgment was
entered against her. She claimed that the property was homestead
property. The facts showed that the title was in her name, but that
the head of the household was her new husband and therefore the
court denied her claim of homestead exemption.
A mother and daughter purchased land as tenants in common. Two
and one-half years later the parties executed an agreement in which it
was recited that they intended to take title under said deed as "joint
tenants or as an estate by the entireties" so that in case of the death of
either the survivor would become the sole owner. When the property
was acquired it was agreed that the mother should live on it rent-free
146. Brown v. Griffin, 75 So.2d 781 (Fla, 1954).
147. DeJonge v. Wayne, 76 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1954), compare with Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946), where the husband had purchased the land and had the deed executed to his wife. The wife made no contribution
of any kind to the acquisition of the property and she did not receive the property as
a gift from her husband. After having acquired the property in the wife's name, the
husband constructed a home on the property and made other expenditures. The court
held he was the head of the family, and the land was homestead property.
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as her home during the balance of her life. Later the daughter and her
husband began to annoy and harass the mother demanding rent from
her and "called her vile names and raised hell with her so passionately
that she was compelled to leave the place." The mother instituted suit
praying that the court adjudicate the rights of the parties in the land.
The court stated that, of course, a mother and daughter cannot be tenants
by the entirety, but that the agreement between the parties constituted
an agreement not to partition the property and to vest title thereof in
the survivor. The court mentioned that such agreements may be dissolved
for fraud, over-reaching, or other grounds recognized by law. If the mother
could show that the agreement to inherit by the survivor had been breached
or that for any legal cause one of the parties had made it inequitable
or unduly burdensome for the other to live by the contract, she was
entitled to have it rescinded and the rights of the parties adjudicated. 148
A contractor brought an equity action to foreclose an alleged lien
for labor and materials furnished for improvements to real property owned
by a married woman. After the time for taking testimony had expired,
the defendant moved for a disposition of the case upon bill and answer.
The court, in reversing, stated that: (I) the plaintiff had failed to
give a written statement that all lienors contracting directly with or
directly employed by the contractor had been paid in full; 14" therefore
there was no cause of action. (2) under the Lien Law' 50 it was required
that in order to have a lien established upon the separate property
of a married woman, the work must have been done "with her knowledge
or assent or pursuant to a contract in writing with her" and that there
were sufficient allegations of this in the complaint, but that the defendant
wife had denied it in her answer, and it was therefore error to enter a
decree in favor of the plaintiff on bill and answer."5
In a case making its second appearance in the Supreme Court, a husband and wife executed mutual and reciprocal wills. The wife died first,
leaving all of her property to her husband. He remarried, and later died
leaving all of his property to his second wife and dis-inheriting a daughter
(of the first wife) contrary to the agreement which he had with his first
wife. The daughter (who was not the daughter of the husband) filed
suit claiming that she was entitled to the estate under the agreement between her mother and her step-father as to the mutual and reciprocal wills.
In the first hearing of the case, 15 2 the lower court held that the second
wife had no notice of the agreement between the husband and the first
wife, and, therefore, the equities were with her and she was entitled to the
whole estate. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further testimony
148. Forhand v. Peacock, 77 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1955).
149. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 84.04 (3) (1953).
150. FLA. STAr. § 85.08 (1953).
151. Barton v. Horwick, 78 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1955).
152. Fuller v. Tod, 63 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1953).
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in regard to the question of notice to the second wife. After the mandate
of the court went down, the Chancellor proceeded to take the testimony
and held that the second wife had no notice, but, in spite of that fact,
under the law of Florida' 53 a husband has complete freedom in testimentary disposition of his property so long as dower rights are assured to
his widow. It follows that after his marriage to the second wife he may
have made the step-daughter the sole beneficiary of his will and therefore
the most that the second wife may claim is her dower interest. 15 4
Torts
Where a husband was driving an automobile, accompanied by his
wife and another couple, and his automobile collided with another automobile, the husband and wife were not engaged in a joint venture even
though the husband was the owner of the automobile:
Aside from the questions of ownership, the only possible theory
upon which it might have been presumed that a joint adventure
relationship existed between Mr. & Mrs. Maxson was bottomed
upon the fact that the couple were husband and wife and that the
husband defrayed the expenses of their joint trip to Florida. If
this be the theory it is not maintainable, because the mere relationship of husband and wife does not constitute a sufficient basis
which to impute to the wife the negligence of the husupon 1 55
band.
In the two Fleming cases, 58 it appeared that a man was living with
a woman, not his wife, and that the man rented an automobile from a
rental company and let the woman drive the automobile. He was held
responsible for her negligent driving of the automobile, ". . . especially
where, to all intents and purposes ... that person was the bailee's spouse."

It is to be noted by these two cases that the Supreme Court, under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine, is- not overly concerned with the legal
title to the automobile, but rather the legal relationship between a bailor
and his bailec, i.e., the bailor may be liable even though legal title may be
vested in a third person.
In the Dobbs' case, a widow brought suit for wrongful death of her
husband. One count was based upon her claim as widow for damages and
the other was based upon her claim as administratrix of the estate of her
husband. The jury was instructed by the court that a portion of the
damages for the administratrix should be based upon the probable, prospective estate which the deceased might have acquired, and they were also
instructed to consider the same element of damage in the charge considering the widow's damages. The Supreme Court in reversing the lower
court stated:
153, FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1953).
154. Tod v. Fuller, 78 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1955).
155. Bessett v. Hackett-Maxson v. Bessett, 66 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1953).
156. Fleming v. Alter, 69 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1954) and Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So.2d
887 (Fla. 1954).
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She was entitled to receive from the estate under a will, should
there have been a will, or dower rights or a child's part, or she was
entitled to receive the same element of damages as the widow
under the count where she claimed as the surviving widow. She
was not entitled to receive the same element of damages twice.
should have made it clear
The charge of the court to the
that if they allowed the widow these elements of damage under
the one count, she could not recover the same elements of damages
under the other. As the case was submitted to the jury the defendant 5is7T required to pay twice for the same element of
damages.'
In the first hearing of the Gissen158 case, an 8 year old girl (who apparently was a female "Dennis the Menace") swung a swinging door in
the lobby of a hotel and thereby injured an employee of the hotel; the
latter filed suit against the minor and her parents. The lower court failed
to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the minor defendant. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that since a Florida Statute'5 9 requires
the serving of a writ or summons upon a guardian ad litem thereafter
appointed by the court to represent the minor defendant, and since there
had been no guardian ad litem appointed and no service of process upon
such guardian, the lower court was totally without jurisdiction over the
matter and over the person of said minor defendant.
In the second hearing of the Gissen"0 case, the court held, as a matter
of first impression, that the parents of a minor tort feasor are not liable
unless it is alleged and proved that the child had the habit of doing the
particular type of wrongful act which resulted in the injury complained of
and that the parents have failed to restrain the child from doing the particular act. It is submitted that the parents of incorrigible children are
lucky if their children are versatile in their wrongdoing. If their children
lack ingenuity in their devilment, the parents may be held liable.
In a case'61 of first impression in Florida, a corporation lent an automobile to its employee to be used by him on a purely personal mission. While driving the automobile, with the knowledge and consent of
the corporation, the employee wrecked the automobile and injured his
wife who was a passenger. The wife instituted suit against the corporate
owner of the automobile to recover for damages resulting from the accident. The court decided: (1) in acocrdance with the weight of authority, and citing the Restatement of the Law Agency, § 217:
A master or other principal is not liable for acts of a servant or
other agent which the agent is privileged to do although the
principal himself would not be so privileged; but he may be liable
or an act as to which the agent has a personal immunity from
157. Dobbs v. Griffith, 70 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1954).

158, Gissen v, Goodwill, 74 So,2d 86 (Fla. 1954).

159. FLA. STAT. § 47.23 (1953).
160. Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955).
161. May V.Palm Beach Chemical Company, 77 So.2d 468
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.
. (Comment b) . . . if an agent has an immunity from
liability as distinguished from a privilege of acting, the principal
does not share the immunity. Thus, if a servant, while acting
within the scope of employment, negligently injures his wife, the
master is subject to liability. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
(2) the court further held that in all of the cases cited, recovery
was allowed under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that in the
instant ease, the servant was driving the master's car on a purely personal
mission. However, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Florida is
bottomed squarely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior arising from a
principal and agent relationship implied in law and therefore the master
may be held liable.
In another case of first impression, a woman was struck by an automobile and died a few hours later on the same day. Her husband sued under
the Wrongful Death ActO2 and alleged as damages the loss of his wife's
future earnings which were disallowed by the lower court because a husband has no right to a wife's earnings. The husband then filed suit under
the Survival Statute 63 to recover damages for his decedent's loss of earnings for her probable life expectancy or for the loss of her probable estate.
The issue, as posed by the Supreme Court was:
In other words, does the survival of the cause of action carry with
it the right to recover the full amount of the damages for impairment of earning capacity which the injured person could have recovered during his lifetime, or does there survive to the personal
representative only the right to recover for such damages as were
actually sustained by the deceased between the time of his injury
and his death?
The court after reviewing the common law history of the survival
statutes and their wording held:
Our conclusion, after consideration of all the above-mentioned
matters, is that there can be no recovery under the Survival Statute
of damages for impairment of earning capacity beyond the death
of the injured person. We are cognizant of the anomaly that
results from this ruling, in that the wrongdoer will be required to
respond in a less amount of damage if the injured person dies,
than if the injured person survives the injury. We must conclude,
however, that the problem is essentially a legislative one-and one
which, as a matter of fact, arises out of the peculiar provisions of
our Wrongful Death Act, rather than the Survival Statute. 6 4
It is submitted that the Legislature would be wise to examine this case
because the very comprehensive analysis made of the Wrongful Death Act
definitely points out that certain amendments should be made to remedy
this anomalous result.

suit .

162. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 and 768.02 (1953).
163. FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1953).
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When a husband murdered his wife and then committed suicide,
the administrator of his wife's estate had no cause of action under the
Survival Statute"'5 against the husband's estate because the wife herself,
if she had survived, would have had no cause of action against the husband
for his tortious injury. Therefore her personal representative, who simply
"stands in her shoes," can have no greater rights then she would have
166
had during her lifetime.
However, the wife's disability to sue her husband will not bar an
action under the Wrongful Death Statute,'6 7 brought by the wife's surviving children against the estate of their stepfather 68
The distinction between the two causes of action is predicated upon
the theory that under the Survival Statute"" the wife's disability to sue her
husband is personal to her and does not inhere in the tort itself, while the
Wrongful Death Act 70 creates, in the named beneficiaries, an entirely
new cause of action, for the recovery of damages suffered by them, not the
decedent, as a consequence of the wrongful invasion of their legal rights
by the tort feasor.
A minor child was injured in an automobile accident while a passenger
in an automobile belonging to a corporation. The insurance carrier for
the corporation agreed to settle with the minor and a friendly suit was
filed. Pursuant to stipulation, a judgment was awarded the minor. A
check was given to the plaintiff's stepfather and attorney. The attorney
turned the proceeds, less his fee, over to the stepfather and the judgment
was satisfied. Later, the minor contended that she never received any
proceeds of the judgment and asked the court to revive the judgment.
The court held (1) that this case was controlled by the Garner Case"'
where it was held that an attorney of record for a minor plaintiff, suing
by his next friend and obtaining a money judgment may, in his capacity
as attorney, receive payment of such judgment and enter satisfaction
thereof. The rationale of the case is that the attorney becomes the general
agent of the infant and responsible to him for the faithful discharge of
the duties required of an officer, of the court, under oath. The court went
on to say that the only defalcations which could have occurred under the
allegations of the minor's complaint were those of the stepfather who had
never been a party to this suit, and that she failed to negative possible
benefits which she might have received from the money paid to her stepfather, who, so far as appeared in the record, was under no legal duty to
support her from his own funds. 7 2
STAT. § 45.11 (1953).
166. Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 706 (1955).
167. FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1953).
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In the Busby case,' 73 the court held that a husband may sue a tort
feasor for loss of services, consortorium and companionship of his wife and
for medical expenses incurred by him on her behalf, without joinder of
his wife.
GUARDIANSHIP

Despite the Florida Statute 174 which provides that no one can be appointed a guardian of the person or property of a persoii alleged
to be mentally or physically incompetent, until there has bcen an adjudication of incompctcncy in separate proceedings, the Suprcme Court ruled that
a ninety-year old woman and her assets could be placed in the hands of a
Trustee inspite of the fact that she was not insane:
...but due to the disabilities of old age, incompetent to manage
her own affairs. Under the broad general powers of equity, the
court had the authority and the power to protect this woman from
herself and from all designing persons.
Justice Drew in dissenting said that the laws of Florida require that before
a court may appoint a guardian certain proceedings must be had and that
there were no such proceedings in this case, hence the authority or right
of the court to act was absent. It is submitted that it does seem strange
that after the legislature has so catagorically spoken, the court has the
judicial effrontery to substitute its own proceedings "under the broad
general powers of equity. 1 76
A man owned a farm and was later inducted into the Army. After
his discharge he was placed in a Veterans Administration Hospital and his
father was appointed his guardian. The guardian received a considerable
sum of money for his ward from the government. The father made an
oral application to the County Judge to make certain expenditurcs on the
son's farm and the judge orally authorized the expenditures. The money
was used for pulling stumps, having the farm bull-dozed, etc., which enhanced the value of the farm. The father filed his report with the County
Judge and the Administrator of Veterans Affairs filed his objections. The
court held:
Strictly speaking, it was error to make the expenditures without
a written order but in this case the error was a harmless one and
the expenditures have been approved by the County Judge and
affirmed by the Circuit Judge. 7 6
In the Grant case,' 77 a step-son filed his petition to be appointed curator
of the property of his stepfather. He claimed that he was the next of kin

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Busby v. Winn & Lovett Miami, Inc., 80 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1955).
FLA. STAT. § 744.31 (1953).
Donnelly v.Mann 68 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1953).
In re Anderson's 6 uardianship, 75 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1954).
Grant v. Odom, 76 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954).
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and was the only heir-at-law of his stepfather. The Supreme Court stated
that:
It is conceivable that a stepson of an alleged incompetent may
be the next of kin of the incompetent. While the term "next of
kin" is sometimes used to refer to "the nearest blood relations of
the propositus in equal degree," . . . we think the term may not
be restricted to this narrow meaning when material and relevant
statutes indicate that a broader meaning is intended. .

.

. Under

the statute of descent and distribution a stepson takes as an
"heir" of a decedent and consequently as one of "next of kin" of
a decedent in those extremely rare and virtually non-existent cases
where, because there are not in existence any heirs of the classes
prior in preference, the estate decends to "the kindred of the
deceased spouse of the intestate in like course as if such deceased
spouse had survived the intestate and then died entitled to the
estate. Section 731.23 (7), Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A."7
A mother of two minor children was divorced from the father and
the custody of the children was awarded to the mother. Subsequently,
the parties entered into a stipulation which was approved by the court
in a decree modifying the award of custody and placing the custody with
the father. Later, the father died and a citizen of Ohio filed a petition in
the Florida court asking that she be appointed the guardian of the persons
and property of the two minor children. She averred in the petition that
the children were residing with her in the State of Ohio. The lower court,
without notice being given to the mother of the children and without any
actual hearing, awarded the guardianship of the persons and property of the
minors to the Ohio resident. The Supreme Court reversed for two reasons: (I) no notice of any kind was given to the parent of the children
as required by law'78 and (2) the guardianship law provides that a
resident of Florida may be appointed guardian of the person and property
of a resident incompetent' 7 and may be appointed the guardian of the
property of a non-resident incompetent,8 0 and also that a non-resident of
Florida may be appointed guardian of the person but not the property of a
resident incompentent.' 8I The court went on to say:
"Nowhere in the low, however, is there any authority for the
appointment by the County judge of a non-resident guardian of a
non-resident
incompetent, either as to his property or his
82
person ?
The legislature amended Section 744.38183 of the Guardianship Law
to allow the County Judge, for good cause shown, to reduce the amount
of bond of any guardian.
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ILLECrrIMACY

Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, an original decree ordered
the alleged father to pay for the expenses of birth, costs, attorneys fees,
and $10.00 per week for the maintenance of a bastard child if it were born
alive. Several months after the decree the alleged father made application
for a reduction of the amount of weekly maintenance.184 Tile Supreme
Court said that there was no evidence of any changed conditions which
would afford a basis for altering the decree. That if there had been any
change, it was a change for the better in regard to the father's financial
position and that under such circumstances it was a clear abuse of discretion to tamper with the provisions of the original decree which were conclusive as to the conditions then existing. 185
A woman filed a complaint charging that a man was the father of a
child which she bore out of wedlock. The woman relied mainly on the
testimony of the defendant's former wife to substantiate her claim. This
testimony, admitted by the lower court, was by the former wife when she
and the man were living together and was with regard to communications
allegedly made to her by her husband at the time when the martial relationship was in full force and effect between them. The court reversed,
holding that it was reversable error for the admission of these privileged
communications between husband and wife. 186
In a case of first impression, 8 7 both under the new and old Bastardy
Acts, a resident of New York filed suit (in 1954) against a Florida resident
to obtain a decree declaring that the man was the father of her child, born
out of wedlock in July, 1943, in New York. The defendant asserted that
her claim was barred by lapse of time, both in New York and Florida.
The court decided that a bastardy proceeding is barred, under both the new
and old acts, if not brought within three years.' 88
184.
185.
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187.
188.

Under FLA. STAT. § 742.06 (1953).
Crosby v. Calhoun, 76 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1954).
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In particular, the court stated:
This court has not decided this question. We have no difficulty in holding, however, that a bastardy proceedings under the Old Act was subject
to the three-year limitation period prescribed by Sub-Section 5 (a) of
Section 95.11, Supra. As a liability "created by statute," it was within
the expressed terms of the limitations act; and even though bastardy
statutes are said to have for their purpose the enforcement of the putative
father's duty to support his child . . . , the gist of the cause of the
action -the main issue of the trial-is whether or not the accused is
the father of the childl . . . What we have said as to bastardy proceedings under the Old Act is equally applicable to proceedings under the
New Act, under the rule that a court of equity will apply the statute of
limitations in an equity suit with the same substantial effect and same
construction as it would receive in a court of law. . . Here, the Plaintiff's
cause of action, if it had accrued under the Old Act, would have been
barred at least as early as 1948... And while, as noted, we held in Rooney
v. Teske, 61 So.2d 376 (Fla. 1952) supra, that the new act should be
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In the second appearance of the above case,' s9 the court held that
when the alleged father, pursuant to the decree of the lower court, paid
court costs, attorneys fees to the mother's attorneys, and twelve months
support for the child, he was not entitled to restitution against the mother
and her attorneys, absent proof of bad faith or fraud upon the part of the
attorneys:
... there is no showing in equity to support restitution, in fact
under the showing made it would be most inequitable to require
it. If ever a court was warranted in leaving a plaintiff where it
found him to 'stew in his own juice,' that is it.
JUVENILE COURTS

In September, 1951, the Circuit Court for Polk County, Florida, entered a divorce decree which awarded custody of two minor children to
the mother. In October, 1952, the Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Polk County, Florida, took jurisdiction of the matter,
found that the two children were dependent children and awarded their
custody to another couple. The mother of the children filed a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the Judge of the Juvenile Court from exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. The relator claimed that jurisdiction had
been vested in the Circuit Court for Polk County and that the court had
not transferred the cause to the Juvenile Court and therefore the Judge
of the Juvenile Court had no power or jurisdiction over the parties and
over the subject matter. The Supreme Court stated:
This contention is not tenable.
For if the power of the
respondent Judge to act in cases of juvenile dependency is derived
from the fact that the juvenile court involved is granted "exclusive,
original jurisdiction" to deal with dependent minors, as the controlling statute provides, (Chapter 27318, Laws of Fla., acts of
1951) the effect of the order rendered by the respondent Judge
was to extinguish the power of the Circuit Court for Polk County
to make further orders with reference to the custody of the minor
children-at least until the respondent Judge entered some appropriate order relinquishing jurisdiction for that purpose. . ..
On the other hand, if it can be assumed that under the circumstances shown by the record the Circuit Court for Polk County
and the Juvenile Court had concurrent jurisdiction of the minor
children, the fact that the Circuit Court acted first in the matter
of their custody did not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction
to act in respect to the issue of dependency and to rule accordingly.
This is so far the reason that while, in general, a tribunal first
exercising jurisdiction over a cause will ordinarily retain it exclusively for the purpose of deciding every issue or question
properly arising in the case, there is nothing to prevent a court of
concurrent jurisdiction from acting on the same subject matter at
given a restropeetive operation, we do not think its retroactive effect
should be extended to revive causes of action which were barred under
the old act...
189. Wall v. Johnson, 80 So.d 362 (Fla. 1955).
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the same time, if the parties involved fail, by timely spacing motion,
to seek and procure a stay of proceedings in the subsequent action.
... Therefore, whatever the correct decision as to whether jurisdiction cxercised by the juvenile court is "exclusive and original," or
is merely "concurrent" because of the pendency of the order made
by the circuit court in the divorce proceeding-a matter that may
not be decided at this time because the issue is not properly within
the scope of this proceeding-it is clear that entering an adjudication that the children were dependent children within the purview
of the applicable dependent and delinquent statutes, the
respondent judge was acting in pursuance of jurisdiction reposed
in hime by the statute.190
It is submitted that it would be wise for the legislature to enact an
amendment to the Juvenile Court Act delimitting the jurisdictional areas
between the circuit and juvenile courts.
MICsLLE ous
Although a statute' removes the disabilities of nonage of all married
female minors, another statute 1 2 makes it unlawful for any minor, whether
or not such person's disabilities have been removed by marriage or otherwise,
to be employed in any plane where alcoholic beverages are manufactured
or sold.193
A father was charged in count one, with unlawful desertion of his
minor children, and in count two, with unlawfully withholding mcans of
support from said children. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one
year on each count. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and the
court held that under the statute, 94 desertion and withholding the means
of support constituted but one offense, hence the lower court was without
jurisdiction to impose the one year consecutive sentence under count two,
and the court further held that it also constituted double jeopardy. 95
A father was tried and convicted on a two count information which
charged first, that he unlawfully withheld support from his two minor
children from August 15, 1952, to November 23, 1953, and secondly, that
he did unlawfully desert his two minor children from August 15, 1953, to
November 25, 1953. He was found guilty and sentenced to one year on
each count. The court held that it appeared that the petitioners stood
convicted of two different crimes, separated by one year in time. This
excluded him from the rule in Deal v. Mayo, supra, where the imposition
of two one year sentences arising from the same unlawful act was
condemned. 198
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